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THE DEBT PROBLEM MADE SELF-MADE VULNERABILITIES: 
THE CASE OF JAMAICA 
 
Philip Osei 
 
 
Abstract. This chapter stresses the point that in Jamaica vulnerabilities in the face of external 
shocks have been aggravated by shortcomings in macroeconomic management, leading to high 
national debt. This situation has tended to distract from the national focus on social development 
as economic growth has stagnated over the past decade. In these circumstances, any lapses in 
governance and malfeasance in public administration is likely to exacerbate the country’s 
problems. The chapter contends that public policy should be at the heart of any index of 
economic resilience, and that any serious analysis of the situation of SIDS should consider this as 
crucial.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the literature on economic vulnerability of small island developing states (SIDS) a consensus 
seems to have emerged on the salient characteristics that make small states vulnerable in the 
context of globalisation. Briguglio (1995; 2004) posits that the vulnerability of this group of 
countries stems from a number of inherent and permanent economic features, including: 
•  a high degree of economic openness rendering these states  particularly susceptible to 
economic conditions in the rest of the  world; 
•  dependence on a narrow range of exports, giving rise to risks associated with lack of 
diversification;   
•  dependence on strategic imports, in particular energy and industrial supplies, exacerbated 
by limited import substitution possibilities;   
•  insularity, peripherality and remoteness, leading to high transport costs and 
marginalisation from the main commercial centres.  
 
It is important to note that most of the characteristics outlined above and the indices proposed to 
measure them assign major prominence to vulnerability with regard to external shocks.  Not 
much importance has been given to internal management conditions that exacerbated inherent 
vulnerabilities of SIDS. I 
 
Briguglio (2004), in a footnote, notes that “there are human induced measures (possibly as a 
result of bad policies or lack of awareness) which exacerbate the inherent vulnerability of SIDS” 
and these are explained in his paper as “man-made actions leading to the weakening of resilience 
against vulnerability”. 
 
While some of the natural characteristics of SIDS are permanent, the present author is of the 
opinion that internal policy-induced frailties might be what makes or breaks the economic 
viability of a SIDS. The realities of the Caribbean show that the vulnerabilities of SIDS indeed 
originate from exposure to external economic and natural shocks, the latter including also 
hurricanes and tropical storms, the occurrence of which threaten the very survival of the economy 
of whole islands. If, however, the negative effects of such exposure are exacerbated by weak 
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macroeconomic management and bad governance, the viability of an already volatile economy is 
seriously compromised.  
 
The present author tends to agree with Bernal (2003) who argues that “most aspects of small size 
cannot be overcome by development policy but the question is could the performance have been 
better and if so would these economies have been more resilient to external shocks?” Bernal 
posed this question with regard to the advantages of development that were offered to the 
Caribbean Community by the extended preferential trade agreements, but which was not fully 
made use of by countries in the region to restructure and diversify their economies.  
 
This chapter will focus on self-made economic vulnerability in Jamaica, referring to bad policies 
and weak administration leading to indebtedness and corruption, which have implications for 
long-term development of the country. In the debate on SIDS, trade vulnerabilities, external 
exposure and economic openness, and the effect of natural hazards have been extensively 
discussed. But not much has been written on internal policies which aggravate the situation, 
although recently the issue is being given more attention (see Witter et al., 2002) 
 
The chapter surveys the Jamaican debt profile and its servicing which currently takes over 60 
percent of government revenue. A UNICEF study in 2000 advocated that “no more than 20 
percent of the revenue of the most highly indebted countries should be spent on debt servicing” 
(Mehrotra et al., 2000: 2). Even though Jamaica is a lower middle income country, its present 
plight might be approximating that of a heavily indebted poor country (HIPC).  
 
The chapter also examines some of the measures that have been adopted to manage and 
ameliorate the situation, including expenditure cuts and new taxes.  
 
2. The Jamaican Debt Burden 
 
Jamaica is a middle income small island state with a population of about 2.6 million. According 
to the UNDP’s human development index it has a medium human development status. The 
country has not been officially declared as a highly indebted poor country (HIPC) but it is one of 
the most highly indebted countries in the world. Its economy is also marked by significant 
inequities in income distribution. In 1989 the World Bank estimated that the top 20 percent of the 
population accounted for more than 60 percent of income. Levitt (1991: 2), writing about the 
origins and consequences of Jamaica’s debt problem in 1991, argued that “the burden of debt 
service fell heavily on wage and salary earners who cannot escape income taxes deducted at 
source.” 
 
The ratio of external debt to GNP reached 206 percent in 1985 but it declined to 150 percent 
around 1989. At the same time, the ratio of external debt to export earnings exceeded 200 
percent. These figures were considered as far above that of the 17 countries that had been 
identified by the World Bank as highly indebted “middle income countries” whose debt to GNP 
ratio was only 61 percent. By 1989 Jamaica’s debt profile was “substantially higher than the debt 
to GNP ratio of low income African countries” (Levitt, 1991: 2).  
 
However, Jamaica continued to be more attractive as a borrower because according to Levitt 
(1991: 2) the country had such a highly open economy with a ratio of exports to GNP in excess 
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of 65 percent (at the time), so that external creditors were better able to collect debt service from 
it than from some of the larger debtors with a relatively smaller export sector.  
 
In the 1980s the country managed to keep up with its debt repayment because of two important 
factors: increases in export earnings and continued external borrowing. In addition to this, the 
country had access to balance of payments support in the form of loans and grants from official 
agencies, even though this was available only on condition of strict compliance with the financial 
targets and policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  
 
The story is somehow different today because since 1997 Jamaica “graduated” from IMF 
borrowing and has been reluctant to go back to the Fund for stabilisation and structural 
adjustment loans. This policy stance has had implications for the structure of contemporary debt 
of the country in that domestic debt has grown substantially, most of which owing to the private 
sector, with serious consequences for macroeconomic management.  As at November 2003 the 
public sector debt stood at 150 percent of GDP. At the same time, a series of mishaps have 
culminated in putting the public accounts in a precarious situation. These included the financial 
crisis of 1997, management scandals surrounding the use of the INTEC Fund in 2001 and the 
mismanagement of the housing development account at the National Housing Development 
Corporation (NHDC) in 2002.  
 
The Debt Profile  
 
Although the country has been a beneficiary of some debt relief from the UK Department of 
International Development (DFID) through projects that have been undertaken in the education 
sector, Jamaica does not generally, have access to such concessional loans as are available to 
HIPC countries. The implications of high interest rates on commercial loans and an unstable 
exchange rate have raised questions as to whether there will be any advantages derived from a 
dollarisation of domestic debt. In addition to this, there are problems relating to the lack of good 
governance in terms of the weak institutional capacity to manage the public sector and 
shortcomings in the structure of public accountability system. The latter are more within the 
influence of government and can therefore be addressed with some good measure of political 
will. 
 
Domestic borrowing has steadily become the most important source of financing the public 
budget in Jamaica. It has grown consistently from J$22,980 million in 1993/94 to J$366,158 
million in 2002/03. Local registered stock is said to be the dominant item in the Jamaican debt 
profile, and are in the form of fixed and variable rates issued with different kinds of coupon and 
maturity structures.  
 
The external debt also had a mix of fixed and variable interest rate composition. As at November 
2003, Fixed Rate Loans formed 75.8 percent of external debt and were valued at US$3,172.31 
million and Variable Interest Rate Loans formed 24.2 percent and were valued at US$1,012.79 
million (Debt Management Unit, 2004).  
 
In an anatomy of the country’s debt, Bear Stearns (2003) provided the following picture on recent 
trends in the Jamaican debt: 
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•  Domestic debt had doubled as a percentage of GDP since 1998, from 47 percent to an 
estimated 94.1 percent as of July 2003. This situation is explained by the governments 
bailout of the financial sector after the crisis of 1996/97 and the creation of the Financial 
Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC). In the liquidation of FINSAC, debt that had been 
owed to the Bank of Jamaica in the form of overdrafts was transferred to the liability side 
of the government’s balance sheet. Williams et al. (2000) note that this has become a 
“permanent feature of the budget”.  
•  In addition to this, “since 2001, the government had sharply increased its issuance of 
US$-linked and straight US$ denominated bonds in the local market. Combined, these 
classes of debt now account for 20.5 percent of the domestic debt, up from 13.9 percent in 
2001.”  
•  In the same way, debenture issuance also increased since 2001 and accounted for 17.5 
percent of domestic debt. The debentures are generally of the fixed rate type and range in 
maturities from 18 to 36 months. With the increasing deteriorating health of  public 
finances the government issued some debentures at interest rates which at time surpassed 
25 percent.  
•  The stock of external debt declined since 2001 because the government paid off more 
than it received in new foreign financing. It is estimated that about half of the external 
debt is owed to multilateral and bilateral creditors.  
 
Debt and Poverty in Jamaica 
 
Historically, the Jamaican economy has had a high debt burden. Some scholars and practitioners 
including Kirkpatrick and Tennant (2002), Bear Stearns (2003), however, commend Jamaica for 
managing its debt and the financial crisis of the late 1990s. FINSAC, the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Company, has folded up because it has fulfilled its mandate of overseeing the 
financial sector adjustment programme, but its accumulated debt of J$108 billion (US$2.49bn) 
equal to 33.67 percent of the GDP which was converted as part of the national debt is now 
beginning to have an impact on the economy, and has also led to the deterioration of the fiscal 
deficit.   
 
In response to the economic crisis of the 1960s and 1970s, the Jamaican government borrowed 
from abroad to finance the balance of payments deficit. Over the years there has been a continued 
reliance on external borrowing and as this increased so did debt service obligations. 
 
Borrowing from multilateral financial organisations and increased debt servicing have major 
implications. Firstly, borrowing from organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank meant 
that the government had to implement structural adjustment programs that included economic 
policies such as increasing interest rates and devaluation and reduction in government 
expenditure among others. Debt servicing resulted in reduction of scarce resources from 
development in expenditure towards services for the poor. Secondly, the government’s ability to 
act independently and in the interest of its electorate has been severely reduced because this has 
been compromised by the high debt owed to the commercial sector of the country. 
 
Debt and austerity management strategies by the Jamaican government have included a reduction 
in government expenditure, wage freeze and increased taxation to generate revenue. There has 
been a wage freeze in the public sector and an increase in property taxes (especially on owners of 
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property valued between J$30,000 to 10 million). Wage freezes in tandem with high food prices 
(as a result of devaluation of the domestic currency) has led to a fall in the purchasing power of 
many Jamaicans. 
 
The large share of debt repayment as part of total expenditure has compromised the role of 
government as provider of public services. Debt repayments have resulted in deep cuts in both 
recurrent and capital expenditure. This means that there has been a decline in both the 
construction of new health and educational infrastructure and the maintenance of existing ones. 
 
Privatisation and the reduction in subsidies to both health and education have resulted in the 
implementation of user charges and an increase in the cost of access to these facilities. The 
consequences of the debt crises are felt mostly by the poor and more so among the vulnerable 
groups in the society, the children, women, elderly and disabled.  
 
Unable to accumulate enough wealth to repay debts the Jamaican government borrows more to 
repay existing debt. Jamaica is therefore caught in a “debt trap”. Kirton (1992) found that the 
social impact of structural adjustment was negative in areas such as health, education, welfare 
housing, unemployment and on food prices. He noted that budgetary allocations to vital social 
portfolios such as education and health, housing and social welfare experienced massive 
cutbacks, as an increasingly greater share of the national budget was diverted to pay for newly 
acquired and growing multilateral debt. These findings were corroborated by Alleyne (1999) and 
Levitt (1991) who also found that debt management strategies had a large impact on the health 
sector, and had serious implications for the poor people who rely heavily on public health 
facilities.  
 
A recent study by USAID referred to the stifling impact of debt on the government’s ability to 
invest in today’s citizens and the leaders of tomorrow, as a result of the increase in the country’s 
debt and the 63 percent of all government revenue used to service debt at the end of 2002. The 
report further argued that “in this economic context, social pressures are inevitable since after 
debt service and payment of public sector salaries, only 5.5 percent of the government’s 
operating year budget is available for all other expenditures” (USAID, 2004). 
 
Table 1 gives a general picture of development in Jamaica since 1989. It indicates trends in poor 
growth with decreasing poverty levels up to 1999 and the seeming stagnation after 2001. For a 
deeper analysis of the Jamaican development conundrum see Le Franc and Downes (2001). 
Table 2 gives further credence to the argument on public expenditure- reduction from the mid to 
the latter part of the 1990s. It shows that expenditure on community services rose from nine 
percent in 1995, to 10.1 percent in the following year, deteriorating to 7.7 percent in 1997 and 
1998 and increasing again to 9.0 in 1999.   
 
3. Resilience Building Strategies 
 
Jamaica shares many inherent economic vulnerabilities with other SIDS. However its domestic 
policies, particularly the debt burden, has exacerbated the country’s vulnerability. In this section 
we examine a number of measures which could strengthen the resilience of the Jamaican 
economy. These measures include debt management strategies, undertaking public management 
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reforms to ensure value for money from the public expenditure on services, building social 
cohesion and anti-corruption measures. 
 
Management of the National Budget and Debt 
 
A historical analysis of the debt burden of Jamaica reveals that by 1985 the debt structure of the 
country was such that a high proportion of the outstanding debt was owed to multilateral 
financial institutions and donor governments and agencies. Robinson (1998) notes that bilateral 
creditors accounted for the largest share of the debt with 40 percent of the debt outstanding, 
while 38 percent was owed to multilateral lending agencies. At that time commercial banks 
accounted for only 11 percent of the total debt outstanding. This had implications for debt 
management because the structure limited the scope of future debt relief as multilateral debts 
were ineligible for rescheduling. From the 1980s to 1996, project financing, structural adjustment 
loans from the World Bank and balance of payments support from the International Monetary 
Fund remained the main sources of financial support for the Jamaican economy (Robinson, 
1998).  
 
In accordance with the adoption of structural adjustment programmes, the debt management 
strategy throughout the 1980s was largely predicated on the assumption that with economic 
stabilisation and adjustment, the country would be able to grow its way out of debt, over the 
medium term. It was hoped that with appropriate reforms and stimulus to the export sector, 
sufficient earnings would be generated to support debt repayment in the future. The main policy 
objective was therefore to seek interim relief on debt service payments while implementing 
economic measures to promote growth. With very little chance of obtaining multilateral debt 
relief, commercial bank and bilateral debts became the centrepiece of the country’s debt 
management programme. However, the hope of sustained growth did not materialise.  
 
As the situation became dire, the Government of Jamaica undertook an important institutional 
response. On April 1, 1998 the Ministry of Finance and Planning assumed responsibility for all 
debt management functions which were previously undertaken by the Bank of Jamaica. With this 
recentralisation, the core debt management functions including debt policy, strategy formulation, 
debt-raising activities, register and payment function for government securities and debt 
monitoring resided fully with the Ministry. The Bank of Jamaica however retained subsidiary 
functions such as conducting primary market issues including Treasury Bills auctions and 
effecting external debt payments (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2004). A Debt Management 
Unit was established at the Ministry with the mandate to raise adequate levels of financing for 
the national budget at minimum debt service costs, and to pursue strategies to ensure that the 
national public debt progresses and is maintained at sustainable levels over the medium term. 
 
Since the latter part of the 1990s, debt management has focused on generating primary surpluses 
from budgetary sources and Jamaica has been quite adept at maintaining these surpluses well into 
the 2004-2005 fiscal years. Between 1998 and 1999 and between 2002 and 2003 the country 
maintained an average primary surplus of over 10 percent of GDP. Internationally, most 
countries consider four percent of GDP to be too high, so according to Bear Stearns (2003: 3), 
though Jamaica’s performance represents a considerable fiscal drag on the economy, and is 
politically difficult, to maintain, it has earned the government some credibility within the debt 
markets and the rating agencies. 
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Partnership and Social Consensus 
 
Apart from the new measures towards good management of the national budget and debt, there 
seem to be a growing feeling that the nation needs a broad consensus on how to get out of this 
debt predicament. A social dialogue for co-operation was entered into between the Government 
of Jamaica and the Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions (JCTU),culminating in a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the 16th of February 2004 (Government of Jamaica, 
2004). This model of social dialogue was fashioned on the Irish and Barbadian experiments of 
1987 and 1993 respectively. Four main factors have motivated the formation of this partnership. 
The partners acknowledged that the country faces (a) a high debt to gross domestic product ratio 
(b) a large fiscal deficit (c) low economic growth and (d) low employment creation” (MOU for 
the Public Sector, 2004: 1). The objectives of the agreement relate to wage restraint, 
macroeconomic management and development of the public sector. It is estimated that the 
signing of the MOU will save the Government J$5 billion in expenditure on wages in the 
2004/05 budget.  
  
Controlling Corruption 
 
Reference here is again made to recent scandals of misappropriation of public funds, for 
example, the NetServe scandal associated with the management of the INTEC Fund, and the 
National Housing Development Corporation imbroglio in which responsibility does not seem to 
have been properly established, thereby warranting a public enquiry. These scandals led to the 
loss of millions of dollars. The crucial issue here is how has Jamaica’s anti-corruption 
infrastructure performed in the midst of these mounting economic difficulties.  
 
It is important to assess the effort put in by the People’s National Party administration and 
undertake critique of how anti-corruption institutions have fared. The main anti-corruption laws 
include: 
•  The Corruption Prevention Act of 2000 which derives essentially from the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption of 1996 to which Jamaica is a signatory.  
•  The Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act. 
•  The Financial Administration and Audit Act. 
•  Auditor General Act. 
•  Money Laundering Act. 
•  Representation of the Peoples Act. 
•  Parliamentary Integrity of Members Act.  
•  Contractor General Act.  
 
Since the mid-1990s most of these pieces of legislation have been amended significantly to 
address the growing sophistication of corruption and crime in general. In addition to this, 
strengthening of the criminal justice system has been attempted by improving the investigative 
capacity of the office of the Director of Public Prosecution to enable him to probe into the 
financial crisis and bring some of the culprits to court. This was done in a bid to recover monies 
lost to the state through the government’s blanket intervention of the financial market at the 
height of the crisis to avert total collapse of the system.¹ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
For an update of the investigations and the measures that have been taken by the government see The Jamaican Herald of 28 March 2004 
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A general critique of the anti-corruption in Jamaica, however, is that in spite of the numerous 
provisions on the statute books, enforcement is weak and most of the institutional infrastructure 
for implementing public policy is under-resourced. This accounts for the cyclical nature of poor 
governance in an otherwise moderately developed small island state. Apart from the financial 
problems, there is a human attitude element to contend with, which is related to the lack of social 
capital. Peter Phillips, the Minister of National Security, in a public debate at the University of 
the West Indies campus at Mona in April 2003, suggested that in addition to normal law 
enforcement Jamaica required a remedy more akin to an ethical mobilisation of the people.  
 
Improving Governance in General 
 
In building resilience against the known inherent disadvantages of Jamaica, more needs to be 
done by way of deepening the public sector reform programme with which the government has 
been engaged since 1996. The reform of public sector entities into executive agencies has 
improved public accountability and upgraded customer services in general (Davis, 2001; CCDA, 
2003). Additional resources would have to be sought through sound budget management to 
support the implementation of Ministry Paper Number 56 of 2002 which set out the vision and 
strategy for substantially improving public administration by 2012. Delroy Chuck of the Jamaica 
Labour Party, in the public debate just mentioned, however, noted improvements in governance 
needs to be underpinned by visionary leadership and trust from the general public to be 
successful. What this argument points to is that the solution to Jamaica’s resilience building 
requires the support of its citizens. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Jamaica, like many other SIDS, is economically vulnerable, in the sense that it is exposed to 
external economic shocks, mostly due to its high exposure to international trade. The country is 
also prone to natural disasters, as evidenced by the recent occurrence of hurricane Ivan. This 
inherent vulnerability could be to an extent mitigated with appropriate macroeconomic 
management and good governance.  
 
In the case of Jamaica, economic vulnerability was exacerbated by the factors that led to the high 
national debt. High debt rates have tended to distract from the national focus on social 
development, as economic growth stagnated over the past decade.  
 
In the future, lapses in macroeconomic management and malfeasance in public administration are 
likely to worsen the country’s problems. It was with this in mind that this chapter contends that 
good of public policy should be at the heart of any index of resilience.    
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